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When two objects are presented in rapid succession, observers ﬁnd it diﬃcult to discriminate their temporal order. Below certain
limit (e.g., 20–70 ms), the rate of correct temporal order judgement is reported to be about 50% (i.e., close to chance level). However
we have found stimulus conditions where order discrimination drops signiﬁcantly below chance level: the stimulus that is presented
as the second is reported as the ﬁrst. It is necessary that the stimuli are very brief, spatially overlapping, clear-cut backward and
forward masking is absent, stimulus onset asynchronies are very short, and luminance contrast of the following stimulus is con-
siderably lower than luminance contrast of the ﬁrst stimulus. The higher the contrast ratio, the stronger the order reversal eﬀect.
However, because also in the conditions where the two stimuli are presented synchronously, the dimmer target is perceived as the
ﬁrst, the eﬀect should be attributed to some implicit bias which enforces subjects to regard a more contrasted stimulus as the one that
appears subsequent to the less contrasted stimulus.
 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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It is well-known that in human vision, order of suc-
cessive objects cannot be easily discriminated if the ob-
jects are presented with asynchronies of less than about
20–90 milliseconds (ms) (Jaskowski & Verleger, 2000;
Michaels & Turvey, 1979; Rutschmann, 1973; Shore,
Spence, & Klein, 2001; Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001;
Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). Below this limit, observers
perform temporal order judgement (TOJ) at a level
which in the case of two equally intense and equidurable
stimulus-objects approaches 50% correct responses as
far as asynchrony values systematically decrease. Very
short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) do not allow a
perceiver to build two internal stimulus-representations
so that the respective diﬀerent delays of eﬀective repre-
sentation formation would allow reliable temporal dis-
crimination. Consequently, bias-free responding leads to* Corresponding author. Address: Institute of Law, University of
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doi:10.1016/j.visres.2003.10.012roughly equal probability for each of the stimuli to be
evaluated as the ﬁrst one. With an increase in SOA, the
correct TOJ rate begins to deviate progressively from
the chance level (50%). All experimental manipulations
that selectively speed up processing of the ﬁrst stimulus
(S1) should facilitate temporal discrimination as well as
all manipulations that slow down processing selectively
for the second stimulus (S2) should do the same. In this
paper, we test this prediction and provide evidence for a
surprising ﬁnding––reversal of reported stimulus order
under conditions that should lead to an increase in
temporal order sensitivity.
Visual latency decreases with an increase in intensity
and contrast of the stimulus (Breitmeyer, 1984; Stro-
meyer & Martini, 2003) and with attentional set (Shore
et al., 2001). We hypothesise that the rate of veridical
temporal order discrimination of S1 and S2 increases if
relative luminance contrast is increased for S1 and de-
creased for S2. We control attentional set to temporal
position and/or luminance-related saliency of the stimuli
so that (1) subjects do not know a priori whether they
should attend to temporally preceding or succeeding
stimulus (Experiments 1 and 2), (2) they have to evaluate
the temporal order of a target stimulus that may be
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the other stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2) and (3) trials
with synchronous presentation of the stimuli are in-
cluded among trials that involve asynchronous presen-
tation (Experiment 2).2. Materials and methods
Six subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal
eyesight participated in the experiment, half in the
condition with positive contrast of the stimuli (luminous
symbols on dark background), the other half in the
condition with negative contrast of the stimuli (dark
symbols on light background).
Two spatially overlapping, successive symbols, X and
O, were presented on the PC monitor, just above the
ﬁxation dot, each for 16.7 ms. To obtain adequate
timing of the stimuli, synchronisation of stimulus frames
in the DOS regime was used. The order of presentation
was varied randomly between the trials so that in
approximately half of the trials X preceded O and in the
remaining part of the trials O preceded X. SOA was
varied between 16.7, 33.4, 50.1, and 100.2 ms, either
randomly (6 subjects) or in counterbalanced blocks (2
subjects). Respective ISI values were 0, 16.7, 33.4, and
83.5 ms. In the pilot study not fully reported here the
design involving blocks of invariant SOAs lead to a
strong order reversal eﬀect. In the main experiment, in
order to control any variations in the possible observa-
tional strategies that might be a consequence of the
blocked SOA conditions, we used the design involving
randomised administration of diﬀerent SOAs with part
of the subjects.
The trials were initiated by the subjects by a keypress,
with S1 appearing after a randomly varying foreperiod
(600–1000 ms). Half of the subjects were run in the
negative contrast conditions, dark letters on the light
background; the other half in the positive contrast
conditions, luminous letters on the dimmer background.
The contrast ratios between S1 and S2 were varied
randomly between the trials: the ratio of S1 (whether X
or O) luminance contrast over S2 (whether X or O)
luminance contrast was approximately equal to 1:1, 3:1,
or 10:1. In the negative contrast condition, the back-
ground was always 120 cd/m2 and the luminance of the
letters was varied between 108, 84, and 0 cd/m2, from the
lowest to the highest luminance contrast of the stimuli,
respectively. The diﬀerences between stimulus and
background luminances that amounted to 12, 36, and
120 cd/m2 provided conditions for 10%, 30%, and 100%
contrast, respectively. These values of the contrasts al-
low both 10:1 and 3:1 luminance contrast ratios between
the stimuli in the pairs of unequal-contrast stimuli where
one of the stimuli has always the highest possible con-
trast value. In the positive contrast condition, thebackground was 4 cd/m2 and the luminances of the
letters were varied between 35, 63, and 120 cd/m2, from
the lowest to the highest luminance contrast of the
stimuli, respectively. (These values were chosen ad hoc
in order to satisfy subjective contrast ratios 10:1 and 3:1,
as adjusted in pilot observations where observers were
asked to match the apparent contrast ratios between the
stimuli in the positive contrast condition to the apparent
contrast ratios between the stimuli used preliminarily in
the negative contrast condition.) Within any one of the
contrast conditions, both of the two successive stimuli
had the same polarity of contrast with regard to the
background. The letters subtended about 0.5 along the
vertical dimension, observed from the subject’s point of
view.
Each subject had one letter designated as target (ei-
ther X or O, counterbalanced between subjects). The
task was to report whether the target appeared ﬁrst or
second in a row of two overlapping, successive, letters.
Our pilot study showed that if S1 had distinctively lower
level of contrast than S2 then strong backward masking
occurred and the shape of S1 became virtually indis-
criminable. We therefore used only conditions where S1
had equal or higher contrast in relation with S2 contrast.
In these contrast conditions, and because only two easily
discriminable shapes of letters representing distinctly
diﬀerent features were used, no masking of stimulus
features was observed. (Also, feature migration between
the stimuli and illusory doubling of stimuli––e.g., OO or
XX––was not reported by the subjects.) Judgments were
typed in via a computer keyboard. Each subject per-
formed 1000–1200 trials overall.
Because only one letter was designated as the target,
the order of stimuli was randomised, and as both stimuli
were presented from the same spatial location, no
attentional bias to spatial location or temporal position
was created. Locational cues for temporal discrimina-
tion that would allow to utilise artefactual information
from directionally sensitive motion detectors were also
absent.3. Results
The results of this study are exactly opposite to what
was expected according to the hypothesis. Veridical TOJ
decreased with increase in the contrast ratio in favour of
S1. We have found experimental conditions where order
of S1 and S2 was apparently reversed in perception (see
Fig. 1a). Because the two conditions of stimuli order (X–
O and O–X) produced similar results, we have collapsed
both respective sets of data to prepare the graphs. (Also,
there was no main eﬀect of contrast polarity [F ¼ 0:035,
p ¼ 0:851] and no signiﬁcant interaction between SOA,
contrast polarity and contrast ratio [F ¼ 0:991,
p ¼ 0:434].) If the ratio between S1 and S2 luminance
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Fig. 1. (a) Percent of trials with correct TOJ as a function of SOA and
luminance contrast ratio between S1 and S2 (ﬁrst experiment). Correct
TOJ rate is high and above chance with equal contrast of S1 and S2
and with longer SOAs above 33.4 ms. Illusory temporal order reversal
is found with SOA¼ 16.7 ms (with S1:S2 luminance contrast ratios
10:1 and 3:1) and with SOA¼ 33.4 ms (with S1:S2 luminance contrast
ratio 10:1). The larger the ratio in favour of S1, the more likely the
reversal. Data is averaged over positive and negative contrast condi-
tions, temporal orders X–O and O–X, and all subjects. (b) Percent of
trials where target letters with higher relative contrast were perceived
as the ﬁrst (preceding) or the second (succeeding) stimulus, plotted for
diﬀerent luminance ratios of the two stimulus letters, calculated
exclusively for the condition of simultaneous exposure of the stimuli
(second experiment). If targets have relatively higher luminance con-
trast, they are more likely to be reported as the second (succeeding)
stimuli; if targets have relatively lower luminance contrast, they are
more likely to be reported as the ﬁrst (preceding) stimuli.
Table 1
Results of the v2-tests performed with the data from all subjects for the
comparison between actual proportions of correct TOJ responses and
theoretically expected 50% correct level
SOA
(ms)
Subject Contrast
ratio
v2 p (2-
tailed)
16.7 IIR 10:1 20.96 0.001
KEI 10:1 9.62 0.001
MAR 10:1 25.3 0.001
JAN 10:1 0.43 0.354
KAI 10:1 5.76 0.001
PIL 10:1 0.01 0.865
IIR 3:1 9.89 0.001
KEI 3:1 2.83 0.020
MAR 3:1 29.33 0.001
JAN 3:1 2.06 0.045
KAI 3:1 1.25 0.117
PIL 3:1 1.43 0.093
33.4 IIR 10:1 17.68 0.000
KEI 10:1 6.4 0.112
MAR 10:1 25.21 0.000
JAN 10:1 0.61 0.273
KAI 10:1 3.74 0.007
PIL 10:1 0.06 0.723
Results shown for the conditions of shortest SOAs and luminance
ratios 10:1 (with SOA¼ 16.7 ms and SOA¼ 33.4 ms) and 3:1
(SOA¼ 16.7 ms) between S1 and S2. In the majority of cases, there is a
signiﬁcant eﬀect () of illusory temporal order reversal. Each subject
experienced this eﬀect at least in one of the experimental conditions.
T. Bachmann et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 241–246 243contrast values is 1:1 or SOAs between the stimuli are
above 33 ms, correct TOJ rate is considerably above
chance. However, if S1 has higher contrast than S2 and
SOA is short (16.7 ms with contrast ratios 10:1 and 3:1
and 33.4 ms with contrast ratio 10:1), reliable order
reversal is observed: in about 70%–80% of all these trials
S2 is reported to be perceived as the ﬁrst appearing
stimulus and S1 as the succeeding stimulus. In Table 1,the results of v2-tests––a comparison between actual
proportions of correct TOJ responses and theoretically
expected 50% correct––are presented for the strongest
illusory order reversal conditions with the shortest SOAs
for all subjects. In the majority of cases, the rate of
subjective order reversal is signiﬁcant.
It is thus clear that very short SOAs and considerably
lower contrast of S2 are the deﬁning conditions for the
illusory order reversal in the perception of successive
stimuli. It is well-known that with very short SOAs,
subjects may perceive the stimuli as simultaneous and
therefore the temporal order reversal could be a result of
the bias to report a dimmer stimulus as the preceding
one without any relevance for the issue of temporal
processing. In order to test whether this may be the case
we ran a second experiment with 6 additional subjects
and included 20% of trials where the stimuli were pre-
sented simultaneously, with subjects being unaware of
this. We successfully replicated temporal order reversal
with asynchronous presentation of more contrasted S1
and less contrasted S2 at short SOAs. However there
was also a systematic bias to report the dimmer stimulus
(X or O, depending on conditions) as the ﬁrst-appearing
one even if the stimuli were presented simultaneously
(Fig. 1b).
It can be argued that the results of the reported order
reversal may be a consequence of another type of re-
sponse bias––to report a less contrasted stimulus as the
ﬁrst in the conditions of shortest SOAs (where reliable
244 T. Bachmann et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 241–246order discrimination is impossible) in order to even up
the more frequent experience of a less contrasted stim-
ulus as the succeeding one in the conditions of long
SOAs (allowing veridical order discrimination). The
reason for this would be an implicit assumption about
the equal frequency of the actual temporal orders of the
less contrasted and high-contrast stimuli. So whereas
more often than not in case of long SOAs low-contrast
stimuli follow high-contrast stimuli (and subjects
veridically see this) then with shortest SOAs (where they
do not veridically see temporal order) they tend to more
often report the opposite order. However, this expla-
nation is ruled out because the subjects who were run
according to the design of blocked SOA conditions and
who initially participated in the conditions with the
shortest SOA nevertheless produced reliable TOJ
reversal already in these conditions (respective v2-values
were 31.1, 32.9, 16.3, and 27.9, all yielding p < 0:001).100.250.033.4 0 
SOA (ms)
first stimulus
second stimulus
M
ea
n 
ra
tin
g 
of
 th
e 
st
im
ul
us
 
co
nt
ra
st
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Fig. 2. Means of perceived contrast ratings of ﬁrst (preceding) and
second (succeeding) stimuli as a function of SOA. Maximum elevation
of the perceived contrast for the second (succeeding) stimulus occurs
with intermediate SOAs.4. Discussion
The theoretical predictions suggested by the tradi-
tional known properties of temporal processing of visual
information point to the opposite direction from what
we actually observed. First, the decrease of stimulus
contrast should lead to increased visual latency (Breit-
meyer, 1984; Jaskowski & Verleger, 2000; Stromeyer &
Martini, 2003) and therefore the second stimulus should
be processed with increased temporal delay. This must
allow better temporal discrimination from the more
contrasted ﬁrst stimulus. Secondly, it is known that both
visible persistence and phase duration of the temporal
response of the visual system increase with decrease in
stimulus intensity or contrast (Breitmeyer, 1984; Stro-
meyer & Martini, 2003). This must also extend active
representation of the second stimulus in time if it is
dimmer, indicating that it is represented later than the
ﬁrst stimulus. Thirdly, because a dimmer stimulus is
more strongly masked its processing latency should be
increased, leading to postponement of its representation.
Again, this should increase the diﬀerence between time
moments with which representations of S1 and S2 are
established and temporal discrimination should beneﬁt.
None of these considerations is supported by the present
facts about order reversal.
The interaction of S1 and S2 could lead to temporal
order reversal according to the perceptual retouch the-
ory (Bachmann, 1984, 1994, 1999), as suggested by
Breitmeyer and €Ogmen (2000) and Scharlau (2002).
According to this theory, the long-latency boost of
facilitatory modulation through the non-speciﬁc thala-
mus which is evoked by S1 arrives at cortical sites of
speciﬁc stimulus-representations right at the time when
the newly arrived fast signals from S2 specify S2 sensory
contents. The speciﬁc signals of S1 processed byrespective driver neurons (Crick & Koch, 2003) and
substantiated by EPSPs have decayed somewhat al-
ready. However the signal-to-noise ratio of speciﬁc S2
information encoded by S2-drivers and substantiated by
respective EPSPs is higher than that for S1 when the
delayed modulation boost arrives in the form of pre-
synaptic excitatory potentials from non-speciﬁc thala-
mus. Consequently, S2 relative saliency is increased and
S2 will be prioritised for explicit representation and re-
places S1 there. Indeed, subjective contrast of S2 has
been shown to be higher after S1 presentation, com-
pared to S2 presentation alone (Bachmann, 1988). Its
visual latency is also decreased (Bachmann, 1989, 1994;
Scharlau, 2002). The higher the S1 contrast, the stronger
the illusory S2 contrast elevation (Bachmann, 1988).
However, the shortest SOAs were not optimal for S2
facilitation (Bachmann, 1988, 1994; Scharlau, 2002).
Instead, intermediate SOAs in the range of 40–90 ms
were. (We conducted a supplementary series of experi-
ments of contrast ratings for S1 and S2 with 4 subjects
and found that with the stimuli used in the present
experiment, maximum relative contrast facilitation for
S2 also occurred with SOAs in the range of 33–100 ms––
see Fig. 2.) It is therefore clear that the eﬀect of priori-
tisation that leads to the illusory temporal precedence of
S2 in our experiment is autonomous from the mecha-
nisms of brightness contrast facilitation and that the
paradoxical experimental reversal of temporal order of
S2 perception is not caused by increased subjective
contrast of S2.
It can be argued that whereas the center of one
stimulus (X) is at the foveola and the contours of the
other stimulus (O) are outside the foveola low-contrast
X may suﬀer from metacontrast more than O, leading
possibly to some complex artefacts. This argument loses
its power if we remember that trials with both orders of
stimuli presentation (X–O vs O–X) yielded similar re-
sults in TOJ despite the prediction that metacontrast
T. Bachmann et al. / Vision Research 44 (2004) 241–246 245and paracontrast should produce diﬀerent time courses
of visibility suppression.
According to the attentional gate model (Reeves &
Sperling, 1986; Shih & Sperling, 2002) it is possible that
later items in a stream of objects appear to have been
presented before the earlier items, given that they have
acquired higher weight in attentional gating. Yet it is
diﬃcult to accept the explanation based on the atten-
tional gate model because (a) decrease in second stim-
ulus saliency should not increase its prioritisation,
predicting results opposite to what we actually found
and (b) the concept of attentional gating has been ap-
plied to short term memory analysis at post-stimulus
delays that by an order of magnitude exceed time
intervals that were speciﬁc for order reversal in our
study (e.g., SOA¼ 16.7 or 33.4 ms).
It has been argued that attentional bias can speed up
stimulus processing (Spence et al., 2001) and dimmer
stimuli may demand more attentional capacity, thus
acquiring attentional priority (Sternberg & Knoll, 1973)
and speeded processing. For these considerations to be
valid, attention should be divided: either between dif-
ferent spatial positions occupied by the stimuli or be-
tween dimmer and more conspicuous stimuli (see, e.g.,
Jaskowski & Verleger, 2000). However, in our experi-
mental design, only one spatial location was used for
presenting the stimuli and subjects evaluated whether
the stimulus which was deﬁned as the target (e.g., X)
appeared ﬁrst or second, irrespectively of its relative
brightness. This somewhat undermines the attentional
bias explanation. However, in the conditions where
luminance contrasts of S1 and S2 were equal, no bias to
report the target either as the ﬁrst stimulus or as the
second stimulus was found. This, to the contrary, rein-
states the view that persistent attentional bias towards
dimmer stimuli can matter: it may override the instruc-
tional bias to attend to the target stimulus.
Our results may seem to be detrimental for the con-
clusions made by Scharlau (2003) who has found strong
evidence against response bias in TOJ where S2 per-
ception was speeded up by S1-primes. If due to masking
interaction between S1 and S2, S2 becomes dimmer then
the bias to prioritise the dim stimulus would speed up its
processing and primed S2 appears subjectively before
the unprimed (and non-masked) stimulus. However it is
known that S2, if primed, appears as more contrasted in
comparison with S2 that is presented alone (Bachmann,
1988). Moreover, priming eﬀects are present when S1 is
masked up to the level of invisibility and S2 relative
contrast maximised. Most probably the priming eﬀects
found by Scharlau (2003) and Bachmann (1988, 1989)
are of diﬀerent origin compared to the order eﬀects
found in the present experiments.
There may be a more probable and simpler expla-
nation similar to that of many other illusions. Visual
processing (as mental processing in general) is adaptedfor survival tasks in natural environments and uses
eﬃciently the correlations that exist in the visual world.
Illusions arise in artiﬁcial tasks to which the system is
not adapted. It attempts to use visual cues that may be
relevant in ordinary environment but are misleading in
this special situation. For example, in the well-known
M€uller–Lyer illusion it is hard to compare the lengths of
the line segments speciﬁed by the instruction and ignore
the whole size of objects (see Morgan, Hole, & Glen-
nerster, 1990). In the present study, relative contrast or
saliency seems to be the misleading cue. Assume that
observers have implicit knowledge that more salient
stimulus has to be the last one. Usually it is, because
backward masking is much stronger than forward
masking. Also, it is normal that memory traces are most
distinct for the latest items. When relevant cues of
temporal order are too weak (with short SOAs) or non-
existent (with zero SOA), observers are inclined to use
the saliency cue that in usual conditions is highly cor-
related with the task-relevant one. But by the design of
the present experiments this usual correlation was re-
versed, resulting in illusory reversal of temporal order.
It is the virtue of illusions that they can reveal hidden
assumptions used by our visual system. The present case
is interesting as it demonstrates that visual system, in
order to enhance adaptive eﬃciency, can exploit not only
the regularities of the outer world but also these of its
own processes. A decrease in stimulus saliency in the
condition of the absence of strong temporal cues is likely
to add weight to the decision state in favour of evaluating
the dim stimulus as the ﬁrst one. This set may be strong
enough to outweigh the eﬀect of the set that requires to
focus attention on target-related form (as required by our
experimental instruction) irrespectively of its saliency.Acknowledgements
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